A “Victory” Lap
From August:
I’d spent all of 2025 and a decent chunk of 2026 watching with ever-increasing agitation what I truly believed was an underperforming squad. No longer. The Rangers were average. They might make the postseason, they might not, but regardless, they were average. I accepted that. I haven’t reduced my watching and listening… I just became a Stoic. In the past two months, both the Rangers and my emotions have hovered within a few games of .500.
Down the stretch, I read others’ analyses of Texas’s performances on the road versus home, scoring first versus last, against good teams and bad, and so forth. Ordinarily, I would be the guy providing those analyses, if only to see what might be a genuine performance issue versus 2025’s rampant bad luck. I certainly don’t blame others for delving into those stats, but this time I bowed out, other than a quick study of the costliness of Texas’s silence in bases-loaded situations (roughly 20 runs below average, equivalent to two wins that would’ve come in handy). I was committed to the idea that the 2026 Rangers weren’t a puzzle to be solved. They just… existed. Also, last I checked, teams don’t receive extra credit for winning on the road or after falling behind or against the Rays instead of the A’s. Those splits are just the residue of the team’s overall quality. It doesn’t really matter from where or against whom the wins come. Good teams just win more. And the Rangers weren’t good.
I did pay attention to run differential, which was telling. Last year’s Rangers outscored the opposition by 79 runs. The 2026 group was outscored by 46. The offense posted a significantly better OPS than last year but scored slightly fewer runs, partly because of poor bases-loaded output. The pitching and defense allowed an additional 114 runs. Last year’s squad was unlucky to have won only 81 games. This year’s version was fortunate to reach 80. They attained that 80 by going 23-17 in one-run games, better than every team in the AL save Tampa Bay.
More from August:
If the Rangers do reach the postseason, maybe we’ll see some stories about finally playing up to expectations or perseverance or (God forbid) destiny. No. They’re an average club. Even if they do some damage in October, which is quite possible given the nature of baseball plus the loopy playoff format, they’re average.
The final week of rival Houston’s season was instructive. The Astros won the division fair and square, but they weren’t really any better than Texas, and their season lasted only an extra three days consisting of two demoralizing losses to the upstart White Sox. Houston did at least have an opportunity to move on to face Cleveland, but here and now, as the World Series is about to begin, can we say the Astros had a better season than Texas? They can boast about the title in the context of a decade-long era of contention, but as for 2026 on its own, their response was canning the GM, field manager and much of the coaching staff. The banner should probably stay unfurled in a cardboard box.
One more callback to August: “It’s possible that playing mostly .500 ball but reeling off nine wins in 12 somewhere in there could be enough to get in [the playoffs].”
That quasi-prediction worked out pretty well. In fact, the West was so blah that nobody bothered with a hot streak. Neither Houston, Texas, nor Seattle won nine of any 12 games in the final six weeks. After I posted that missive, Texas closed the season at 19-18, Houston 18-19, Seattle 17-20. Texas remarkably had the league’s fifth-best record in that span but to no avail. Aside from the Rangers and especially the Guardians (who usurped the division tile from Chicago), every would-be contender for the final wild card spot was below .500 down the stretch.
Okay, I nailed the situation and outcome, saving myself some emotional distress while others wept and gnashed their teeth. Hooray for me, I guess.
But now what? (Note: I’m ignoring the possibility of a lockout as well as seismic changes to the CBA. This thing’s already long enough.)
The Roster
Even though the current roster has few remaining pieces from 2023, it still feels of that era. Every subsequent year has been an effort to repair or augment the existing roster in order to maintain a contending run. Things haven’t worked out, there’s nothing left to hang on to, and it’s time to move forward.
Easier said than done, though. Let’s take a look at the 40-man roster:
Under Contract: deGrom (1 more year / $37mm), Eovaldi (1/$24), Jansen (1/$7.25), Seager (5/$157.5), Nimmo (4/$82)
Under Reserve: Pitchers Ahlstrom, Baumler (also subject to Rule 5 restrictions), Collyer, Corniell, Davalillo, Gray, Leiter, L. Lopez, Macko, Otanez, Peoples, Rocker, Santos, Silseth, Teodo, Winn, position players Cauley, Freeman, Foscue, Helman, Osuna.
Arbitration-Eligible: Bradford (1st year), Garcia (1), Gore (3/last), Latz (1st Super 2), Burger (2), Carter (1st Super 2), Duran (2), Jung (2), Langford (1), O’Hoppe (2nd Super 2)
Impending Free Agents:, Alexander, Beeks, Junis ($5mm option, $1.25 buyout), Montgomery, Quantrill, Williams, Diaz, Higashioka ($7 mutual, $1 buy), N. Lopez, Pederson ($18.5 mutual)
There is no roster crunch. Assuming no signings of mutual options, Texas can tender contracts and arbitration offers to everyone and still trim the roster to 36. Additionally, the Rangers might not add a single Rule 5-eligible player to the roster.
If, say, Texas extends arbitration offers to everyone but O’Hoppe, the top eight positions players are already in place plus Justin Foscue as a righty DH/PH/2B. That does affix Zeke Duran to second base, at least against righties. The only glaring absences on the batting side would be another catcher and a lefty DH (or a regular right fielder if Nimmo becomes that lefty DH).
The Rangers miraculously received 153 starts from just seven pitchers in 2026, and six responsible for 138 of them are under team control. The problem is only one finished with an above-average ERA, and he’s presumably out the door. Cal Quantrill is extremely unlikely to repeat last year’s 2.86 ERA, but regardless, he’s not re-signing on a minor deal.
The bullpen was heavy on mercenaries the past two seasons and probably will be again in 2027, hopefully with a success rate more akin to 2025. For example, declining arbitration to boring but competent Jacob Webb and instead talking Chris Martin off his recliner and signing Alexis Diaz to an MLB deal didn’t work out at all. Texas does have a whopping 14 MLB-experienced relievers (including a few with SP potential) already under contract. How many new relievers are needed depends on how many of those 14 you trust. It is deeply frustrating that Corniell, Santos and Teodo exited 2026 with the same uncertainties as when they entered. Or, to the extent we have answers, they aren’t reassuring.
Not long after O’Hoppe was acquired, I’d speculated favorably about him getting arbitration. I doubt he’d cost more than $3 million, so he’d be cheaper than the typical second catcher on the market, although the cheapest option would involve a half-dozen NRIs in their thirties fighting for a spot. (Texas has no internal options.) He and the coaching/development staff appear to have improved his standing at the plate. As for behind the plate, the Rangers really didn’t want him there, did they? He played in ten MLB games but caught only one inning, the 9th of a 9-1 loss at Arizona.
I did say offering arbitration to almost everyone would result in eight defensive positions filled, but not without caveats. WAR understates Duran’s value in 2026. Whenever anyone else was hurt or lacking, he was there. Duran made at least 14 appearances at six different positions. If he’s locked into one spot in 2027, who fills his role? Probably someone inferior. I would love Duran to keep his current role as everyday utility player, which would require someone else to man second on a regular basis against righties.
Likewise, CF isn’t really filled because while I would offer arbitration to Carter, I’d expect him to begin 2027 in Round Rock in a final attempt to get something, anything, from him against lefties. It’s also worth noting Carter was barely adequate against righties. Carter is the rare player with enough defensive value to compensate for what he did at the plate in 2026, but at some point, writing his name in the lineup becomes untenable.
The Farm
Any direction the Rangers choose for 2027 would be more promising if Texas could count on meaningful on-field contributions from prospects, but that’s unlikely beyond the singular Sebastian Walcott. Texas received little from true rookies in 2026, and expanding the 2027 list beyond Walcott is more hope than plan.
Are Dylan Dreiling and Rafe Perich upcoming everyday players who’ll provide dividends in 2027? Paxton Kling? Malcolm Moore? Those are big asks. On the pitching side, David Davalillo and Dalton Pence are back-of-rotation types who aren’t quite there yet. Winston Santos is probably a reliever. It’s hard to know what Emiliano Teodo and Jose Corniell are at this point. Anyone else is at least one extra year away. Sure, someone is likely to break through, but the Rangers can’t prepare for 2027 with any expectation of it.
So if Texas can’t count on much from the farm in terms of actual production next season, what about trades? It is not quite a system built for a win-now push. Assuming Walcott is off-limits, the Rangers do have other worthy prospects to dangle if desired, but upgrading through trades will shove the system’s quality back among the bottom few clubs in the league.
I still haven’t answered my question: Now what? I see three paths.
Sigh… The Middle Path?
The Rangers aren’t being gutted by free-agent losses this fall. They’re sitting on perhaps 75 wins right now and can rebuild to 80-82 with a handful of relatively inexpensive free-agent relievers, a second catcher, another decent bat. Not necessarily no meaningful trades, but generally a reliance on existing personnel. Then play some games, assess the situation and trade with an eye on genuine contention if the situation is promising.
On an emotional level, this path is terrible, borderline indefensible. In a division with zero winning clubs, the Rangers would be saying “okay, things haven’t worked out, but maybe this time.” Good luck selling season tickets for that. Prepare for stories about how the infirm will try to stay healthier, how some hitters are working to shrink massive platoon splits, how the squad will try to emulate those who advanced deep into the 2026 postseason. The atmosphere would be stale heading into spring training and increasingly sour if the style and results of the past two years persist.
This is more than just the easy path, though. Following it wouldn’t just be laziness or inertia. A vexing issue is Texas isn’t running out zero-WAR players at multiple positions. Instead, they have many at or just below average plus a fair number who are better yet still disappointing. In the short run, the team feels stuck in place, or perhaps I just lack the vision to see otherwise.
For example, maybe you want someone better than Jake Burger. He led the team in homers and RBI but still comes across as underwhelming. He posted a 1.7 WAR (average of Baseball Reference and Fangraphs), just on the shy side of league average. But there’s no one in the system ready to replace him, so absent some luck, simply acquiring equal production could cost either prospects or more than the $6.9 million (as estimated by MLB Trade Rumors) he’s expected to make in 2027. Evan Carter’s negligible offense is almost completely offset by stellar defense. Brandon Nimmo is extremely okay; mainly, he’s not Marcus Semien, who could very well be out of baseball by this time next year.
MacKenzie Gore did not become the pitcher worthy of a five-prospect trade, but he’ll provide 170+ so-so innings for $8-9 million. You’re not getting that in free agency. Wyatt Langford is solid but neither as good nor healthy as hoped. Corey Seager is still good but seems a lock to miss at least a quarter of the season, and his 2026 at the plate was his worst in eight years.
With Burger and others, addition by subtraction might not accomplish as much as hoped. We needn’t look far into the past for similar instances. I obviously approved of waving goodbye to Adolis Garcia, and the Semien trade made sense, but both were strong defenders in 2025, and their absence weakened Texas’s run prevention last year. One possibility is non-tendering Burger or executing a sign-and-trade, then shifting Jung to first and installing Duran at second and Sebastian Walcott at third (assuming he’s ready). That might work, but it creates the problem of leaving Duran’s critical 2026 role to someone likely inferior.
I am assuming under this scenario that budgetary constraints will be just as tight as 2026. This would involve arbitration (or pre-arb agreements) for almost everyone, because as I said, everyone has at least some value and would be less expensive than open-market acquisitions. So, if not O’Hoppe as second catcher, someone similarly priced or an NRI casting call. No full-time DH, which might be for the best regardless of money in order to give some injury-prone players quasi-rest days. A cavalcade of non-roster depth SP options who mostly take their opt-outs and are replaced by opt-outs from other clubs as the season progresses. Several one-and-done free-agent relievers.
Doesn’t exactly get the blood pumping, does it?
Go For Broke
This is tricky. The free-agent market isn’t strong, especially for hitters. Weak enough, in fact, that Joc Pederson’s $18.5mm mutual option is actually worthy of discussion. (This piece on available DHes will not make your day.) He was pretty good in 2026. He’s also about to be 35. Do you sign that check? As I said, I think Texas is better off using a rotation at DH, so maybe not Pederson per se, but you’re looking at players of that ilk. A final push likely means spending medium-to-large amounts on short-term deals, which usually means old folks and bounce-back candidates. A huge risk, ripe for obvious failure and derision. “Wow, the Rangers signed a bunch of broken down players and they stayed broken.”
The other acquisition path is trades. Every prospect but Walcott is on the block. Caden Scarborough. Yolfran Castillo. Last year’s top picks. All available for win-now players. This would leave an already ordinary system in tatters.
Three-fifths of the rotation is gone after 2027, and several others are approaching the end of their arbitration years, so this strategy is either a one-and-done followed by a tear-down or an obligation for continued profligate spending to keep the competitive window open. Maybe it works, and the Rangers are a squad others fear to face next October. Maybe.
Someone else could probably describe this situation more appealingly. Heck, maybe the Rangers sign Tarik Skubal the night before the lockdown. Regardless, the downside of this path sets the organization back for years, which is why I say a “middle path” isn’t negligence on management’s part. Deviating from it is hard.
Tear It Down
This is the path I offered in August if a larger budget isn’t forthcoming, regardless of whether Texas had advanced to the postseason. I did say a “strip-to-the-studs rebuild” wasn’t necessary, but no, let’s tear down the studs as well, maybe even pour a new foundation.
Inform deGrom, Eovaldi and Seager of the team’s direction and then get what’s gettable for them. Possibly keep Gore into the season because he’s still fairly cheap and the innings have to come from somewhere, but consummate at some point. Returns for these players aren’t going to be great and will depend on how much salary Texas is willing to absorb. Extend arbitration to (nearly) everyone, because (nearly) everyone has some value and won’t be too pricey. Then, explore deals on all those guys except for Duran. Attempt an extension on Duran, then ship him as well if one can’t be reached.
By season’s end if not April, that would result in a roster stuffed with the 2027 equivalents to Jarred Kelenic, Jonah Bride, Marco Gonzalez (gulp), etc. It could also mean wasting some of Walcott’s cheapest seasons, although a tear-down strategy almost certainly entails him spending enough time in AAA to delay his eventual free agency. Never in recent history have the Rangers been guilty of manipulating a player’s service time, but unless he displays Langford-like readiness next March, he needs to hang out with me in Round Rock for at least a month.
In the short run, the Rangers would be posting triple-digit losses, but they’ll have a rejuvenated farm and eventually a younger, more dynamic core ready to be augmented with premier free agents.
This all presumes that when the moment is right, Texas will resume spending like a big-market club as it did in the offseason preceding 2022. I’ve seen some articles suggesting Texas wants to be more than Milwaukee or Cleveland or Tampa Bay. Sure, great, whatever. But if this retrenchment includes a cynical feint to thriftiness for its own sake, why bother. May as well keep building 81-win teams and hope for the occasional 86.
Choose Your Own Adventure
I haven’t covered everything, and I’m sure you’ve thought of things I’ve neglected, but I think this lays out the three basic paths. Going for broke seems the least feasible. The money doesn’t appear to be there, and money might not be enough regardless. Even a lavishly funded 2027 could result in an AL version of the Mets. A rebuild makes more sense to me. A bunch of players are out the door soon, and it’s time to work on their replacements. The Rangers can briefly bide their time with the middle path, but change is coming.
Next Up
Trade reviews, fall ball, 40-man deadline preview, analysis of whatever the Rangers do between now and the lockout.
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