3/31: The Daily Report Primer

Every year, I publish a primer as a guide to my daily reports: how the minors are structured, how the game is played and managed, what I look for, what stats I follow and ignore. This year’s version is largely rewritten (fewer words, more charts), so I’m presenting it whole instead split across two days.

STRUCTURE AND CONTEXT

Does Winning In The Minors Matter?
No. But also yes, a little. Winning is certainly more fun than losing, and some organizations emphasize winning as part of the culture. More to the point, does the quality of a club’s prospects correlate to winning? Here’s the 2025 comparison of a farm’s pre-season ranking (the average of several publications) and the club’s aggregate win rate for their four full-season teams.

Each higher spot in the rankings is worth about 1.2 wins out of an average of 546 games played, and the error bars are large. So, sure, farm talent affects the standings, but only subtly, and you certainly wouldn’t want to conclude that an organization has better prospects simply because it has a better minor league record. 

Minor leagues teams are never populated and almost never operated strictly with winning in mind. For example, OF Dylan Dreiling is new to AA and coming off a decent if not stellar 2025 in high-A. Offseason signing and teammate Orlando Martinez is 28 has 468 games at the upper levels. There’s a decent chance he’ll outhit Dreiling in 2026, but (with due respect) he will not be getting at-bats at Dreiling’s expense. At the same time, a huge chunk of plate appearances and batters faced will be taken by players who won’t ever reach the Majors. 

In terms of strategy, what we might see during the season are some adjustments late in the first and second halves when a team is facing a tight divisional race. Perhaps a rotation wiggled to give a better starter one more shot, heavier reliance on the best relievers in the high-leverage situations, more pitching changes within innings, maybe even some pinch-hitting. 

Park and League 
Any analysis I provide will be in the context of the environment. Here’s the park-adjusted league averages for Texas’s full-season squads in 2025:

Round Rock is very pitcher-friendly compared to the mountain cities of the Pacific Coast League, but the PCL is absurdly hitter-friendly as a whole, such that judging player performances is perilous business. Hub City played neutral in a pitcher-friendly league in its inaugural season. Slugging .400 means one thing at the lower levels and something entirely different in AAA. 

Players hit twice as many homers in AAA as low-A, a combination of physical maturity, the cream rising to the top, a different ball and sometimes more favorable hitting environments. 

Starting Pitchers
They don’t throw like they used to. In 2007, Texas had five farmhands aged 25 or younger throw at least 150 innings, topped by Andrew Walker with 167. Last year, Jose Gonzalez led the Rangers with just 115, followed by Josh Stephan (111) and David Davalillo (107). The median length of a start among Texas’s four full-season teams was exactly four innings, only 37% lasted five, and just 11% lasted six. That’s a function of the schedule, the more protective nature of development, and expanded rosters containing more relievers needing to throw. The strict one-day-off-per-week schedule instituted in 2021 lends itself toward once-a-week starts instead of every five or six days. 

Even so, starting pitchers are supposed to get their work in, so they are often allowed to work through ugly situations that would demand a reliever in the Majors. An early pull is probably due to pitch count rather than results. In general, 30 pitches in an inning is cause for removal, depending on the situation and the pitcher’s age and experience. 

Control is much worse in the minors, a subject I’ll revisit later:

Relievers
In the minors, relievers are much more likely to work on a relatively fixed schedule than be selected for a particular situation. This is the case even in AAA, ostensibly the final proving ground for MLB. Relievers tend to be given a set one or two innings, and mid-inning changes are uncommon. That said, previous AAA manager Doug Davis was given leave to manage closer to MLB fashion, a departure from previous years. We’ll see how new manager Kyle Moore operates.

Texas’s minor league teams rarely have set closers, and duties might be assigned more on trustworthiness than prospect status. 47 Rangers recorded a save in a full-season game last year, led by the eight of Robby Ahlstrom and Gavin Collyer. In the last 18 years, nine Texas minor league relievers have recorded 20 saves in a season. None has ever subsequently saved a Major League game.

A minor league team might have ten or more relievers, so outings on consecutive days are almost unheard of at the lower levels and increasingly rare even in AAA. Back-to-back appearances can be a tell that a pitcher is being readied for promotion to Arlington. Certainly, that would be a newsworthy event for someone like Emiliano Teodo or Marc Church. 

Running
Recent rules encouraging base-stealing were tested in the minors before their MLB adoption. In 2021, Texas’s Down East affiliate set an all-time low-A record for most successful attempts per game (2.41), and their total of 290 was only nine short of the record despite playing 20 fewer games than normal. The next year, the Wood Ducks stole 308, setting the low-A record and falling five shy of the most by any minor league team since at least 1990. Since then, 11 other teams have stolen at least 300 led by Aberdeen’s 363 (2.8 per game!). 

As a percentage of plate appearances, teams run 50% more often in AAA than MLB and 135% more often in low-A. Despite the extra attempts, the success rate is similar across levels, about 78%. 

Substitutes
No iron men in the minors, at least not in the Texas system. Hub City’s Casey Cook led the organization in fewest games missed with 12. With few exceptions (say, a young player temporarily filling an injury hole at an upper level), nobody is going to spend an entire week’s worth of games on the bench. 

Errors and Other Mistakes

They’re much more common in the minors:

The preceding chart undersells the disparity. The lower levels also have more fielder’s choices that result in no outs, ill-advised throws to the plate that allow trailing runners to advance, botched rundows, etc. 

OBSERVATIONS

What I’m Looking For With Hitters

If you’re permitted only one data point to assess a prospect’s status, choose age (relative to others at the same level). Think Sebastian Walcott, Jurickson Profar and Elvis Andrus getting AA assignments as teenagers. 

Of course, players drafted out of college will be older, so dismissing them for being 23 in high-A would be ridiculous. However, the older the player, the higher the expectations. (Incidentally, that a good many college players don’t handle A-level ball reinforces just how hard the pro game is.) Catchers tend to take more time and deserve more patience.

Texas was (in)famous for aggressive assignments during the late 2000s and into the 2010s but eased back toward the end of that decade. Promotions today feel more player-tailored and less driven by organizational culture. However, last year, high-A Hub City was populated with a bunch of 2024 picks who either skipped or barely saw low-A. 

In terms of the “slash stats” (average, on-base percentage, slugging), I pay more attention to average in the minors than the Majors. Frequent and authoritative contact matters. The stats mean the least at the lowest levels. (Please don’t “stat scout” the Dominican Summer League.) They grow in importance as players advance, especially for players not expected to help with the glove. There is no quality of defense at first base that will compensate for a weak bat. 

The ability to lay off a dubious pitch can define a career. Walks create hitting situations with runners on base, wear down the pitcher, and mitigate inevitable slumps. Overreliance on walks can be a problem, though. Control is often dire at the lower levels, and I don’t blame hitters for falling into a passivity trap. Eventually though, a batter will reach a level at which pitchers generally have acceptable control plus some command, and a passive approach will result in a bunch of uncomfortable two-strike counts. 

Strikeouts aren’t a problem, until they are. Mostly, strikeouts don’t hurt any more than other types of outs, but a strikeout rate far above the league average can indicate the hitter might be overwhelmed at a higher level. 

In terms of mechanics… look, I’m not a scout and would never present myself as being on that level, but I’ve watched a game or two. Originally, I’d presented a list of questions I’m trying to answer (or at least discuss) when seeing hitters and pitchers in person, but it went on forever. You generally know what scouts are looking for. I’m looking for most the same things. I’m just not a professional. 

What I’m Looking For With Pitchers
I list Earned Run Average in the daily reports because it’s a nice shorthand, but I’ll try to mention when the pitcher is performing better or worse than that indication. For example, here’s two Texas minor league relievers from 2025:

Pitcher A: 0.75 ERA, 1 HR per 118 batters, 12% BB, 21% SO
Pitcher B: 3.88 ERA, 1 HR per 105 batters, 11% BB, 27% SO

The pitchers had a similar homer rate, but B walked slightly fewer and struck out many more, yet his ERA was nearly three runs higher. The performance of Pitcher B (Geraldo Carillo) was slightly better than his ERA suggests. Pitcher A (Cole Winn) wasn’t bad – indeed, he pitched his way back to the Majors — but he was very lucky in terms of ERA. Winn had an 88% strand rate in AAA, unrepeatable in the Majors.

Oh, wait. Winn had a 90% strand rate for Texas last year. That’s unrepeatable, unless Winn is going to be peak-level Edwin Diaz henceforth. 

Collectively, homers, walks and strikeouts are more trustworthy indicators of performance than ERA. Homers are tricky because they can vary greatly from year to year, but a pitcher with a high fly rate and tiny homer rate is probably bound for regression. Walks and strikeouts stabilize more quickly. 

In recent years, I’ve consistently mentioned the minors’ worsening control along with increasing strikeout rates (which have actually stabilized recently). What I haven’t done is compare the minors to the Majors. Are MLB pitchers walking more as well? Here’s the median rates across all levels for pitchers who start most of the time:

Minor leaguers have gotten much worse as a group, while MLB pitchers have kept trucking along. I’ve yet to test how many current MLB starters had better-than average control in the minors versus requiring substantial improvement. My hunch is the former is more common. Regardless, a minor league starting prospect sitting on an 11% walk rate has work to do. Very few MLB starters succeed with a rate above 10%. 

How about relievers:

Yes, control among MLB relievers is worse than starters, but not that much worse. And control by relievers in the minors has always been worse than MLB, but that difference has ballooned recently. 

It’s not uncommon to see a minor league reliever thoroughly dominate despite poor control. They walk too many, but they miss so many bats and allow such little contact that the walkers never get to do more than jog to the base and eventually back to the dugout after a third-out K. Examples in the Texas system include Demarcus Evans and Joe Barlow. Pitchers of this type can reach the Majors, but success can be limited. Very few pitchers maintain those minuscule hit rates in the Majors, so the walks eventually cause serious problems. 

I don’t necessarily worry about save opportunities, but I do look at who’s getting the high-leverage situations, some of which occur earlier. For example, in Round Rock’s opener last Friday, Peyton Gray and Gavin Collyer entered mid-inning with runners on base in a tight game. 

Strikeouts are critical for starters and relievers, of course. A pitcher with a below-average K rate had better have plenty of compensatory abilities, like great control and induction of grounders. Interestingly, relievers used to strike out many more batters than starters, but in recent years that gap has disappeared. Comparing Texas’s low-A leagues from past to present, the 50 busiest starters had a strikeout rate of 19% in 2007 and 25% in 2024. The corresponding figures for the 50 relievers finishing the most games were 25% and 24%. 

I usually present a combined walk and HBP rate rather than just walks because hit batters have increased enough to be meaningful. Sometimes, enough to be ridiculous. Low-A Modesto hit 191 batters in 130 games in 2024.

If you want a handy second-order stat, use “K-BB,” which subtracts a pitcher’s BB (or BB+HBP) rate from his SO rate. The best pitchers have high figures, either because they have strikeout ability plus good control or elite bat-missing results that compensate for below-average control. 

What I’m Looking For With Fielders
Defense is hard to assess in the minors. Basic stats like errors don’t tell a complete picture and are sometimes misleading. Shortstop A might make five more errors than Shortstop B but turn an extra 20 grounders into outs. Give me Shortstop A. All games are televised, but that’s no substitute for watching in person, and in any case even I’m not watching four minors league games in full six nights a week. Maybe when I retire. 

Where someone plays is useful information. If Player C is shortstop 80% of the time and Player D splits between second, short and third, that’s worth knowing. If Player C finds himself mostly at second base upon promotion, that’s worth knowing. 

Promotions / Demotions
Promotions and demotions aren’t made in a vacuum. A promoted player is necessarily taking someone else’s spot. Should that other player also be promoted? Demoted? Moved to a different position? Released? Should the players share the position and moonlight at DH? Should the promoted guy move to a different position instead, and who would that affect? These decisions are often complicated, and a player might advance more slowly than you’d like because Texas has to sort through all these issues. 

Statcast
I haven’t talked much about Statcast in the discussions of what I’m looking for, but its deeply ingrained in what I study and write at the AAA level. Are hitters exhibiting contact rates and exit velocities that will thrive outside the friendly Pacific Coast League setting? Are they mauling fastballs and flailing against the rest?  Are pitchers getting first strikes, missing bats, avoiding too many flies (or surviving them if not), developing a repertoire broad enough to start? 

During Spring Training, I presented a subset of Statcast data for pitchers and hitters on my website, and I intend to do the same for AAA once a large handful of games have been played. 

THE REST

Runs Scored, RBI, Pitcher Wins/Losses

Ignored except as occasional anecdotes. 

Luck 
Statistical variance in baseball is higher that most people think. Some player you like will start the season 2-for-24 or get roughed up in back-to-back starts. Some player you’ve never thought of will hit .320 in April. An exceptionally poor stretch might be cause for concern, but it might also be plain old variance. 

Report Tone

Texas has 26 active Majors Leaguers. Texas also has over 200 minor leaguers, most of whom won’t reach MLB or make much impact if they do. “Losers,” if you’re being heartless.

I’m not heartless, or at least that’s what I tell myself. Reaching even the A levels is an outstanding achievement. The number of “winners” is ridiculously low. In other industries, opportunities can grow with population and the economy. In MLB, 30 owners control the number of jobs. Since 1998, the US population has grown by 25%, the US Gross Domestic Product has increased an inflation-adjusted 89%, and the number of MLB teams has increased by zero.  

Players that don’t make it are not losers. They’ve actually never been better. There are pitchers stuck in AAA with repertoires that I guarantee would have made them passable MLB relievers a dozen years ago. There are hitters who would be no worse than capable bench players.

Ultimately, I want to be honest about a player’s likelihood of reaching the Majors and of success at that level, and I focus on the prospects most likely to help Texas in the future, but I’ll cover anyone having a great day. 

Tables!
I maintain organizational charts here: the 40-man roster (presented by time of addition), team rosters, Rule 5 timetables, minor league schedules, etc.

Social Media
I tend to post much more often to Bluesky than Twitter/X. I cut back sharply on social media in general in 2025, partly for mental health, partly because I was tending to post observations on social media but neglecting to include them in my reports. That’s not fair. I might boost my online output this season, but subscribers come first.