The Daily Minor League Report Primer

Every year, I publish a primer as a guide to my daily reports: how the minors are structured, how the game is played and managed, what I look for, what stats I follow and ignore. In recent years, it’s grown to well over 4,000 words split into two reports. I’ve shortened it some and present it here in full.

Winning?
These are developmental leagues. Rosters aren’t constructed and games aren’t managed to win, at least not as a primary goal. Good prospects aren’t going to be benched if they perform poorly. Does the prospect quality of a system correlate to its performance in the minors? Not so much.

A big chunk of Texas’s #3 ranking last year was due to Wyatt Langford and Evan Carter, neither of whom played in the minors last year (except briefly on rehab). Adrian Sampson and Sandro Fabian had more impact on the farm’s won-loss record than them. Some organizations emphasize winning more than others, but it’s a means (to fostering a winning culture, presumably), not an end. My concern isn’t about winning as much as excessive losing. In 2021, White Sox-affiliated Kannapolis lost its first ten, then 16 of the next 20, and were 32-78 (.290) heading into the season’s final couple of weeks. No thanks. The last truly terrible Texas-affiliated team was almost 20 years ago, when low-A Clinton and its extremely young pitching staff finished 45-94.

Starters
Beginning in 2021, MiLB’s full-season league switched to a six-games-a-week schedule, which encourages but doesn’t compel a six-man rotation. At different levels, the Rangers might employ six starters or use five and put the Tuesday-Sunday starter on a tight leash on getaway day. Sometimes, it’s a bullpen day.

Regardless, the workhorse has disappeared. Compiling the stats of old for my new daily feature drove this home.

Top five in Texas MiLB innings, Age 25 and younger, 2007:
1.    Andrew Walker, 167
2.    Mike Ballard, 164
3.    Eric Hurley, 162
4.    Omar Poveda, 153
5.    Armando Galarraga, 152

Top five in Texas MiLB innings, Age 25 and younger, 2024:
1.    Mitch Bratt, 110
2.    David Davalillo, 110
3.    Winston Santos, 110
4.    Nick Krauth, 107
5.    Kohl Drake, 106

In 2024, the median length of a start by a Texas minor leaguer was 4.2 innings, which is actually higher than 2023. The organization had zero complete games. AAA starters aren’t necessarily working longer; in fact, the median length was shorter in AAA (4.1 IP) than AA and High-A (both 5.0).

Still, Texas does want starters to get their innings, so pitchers will often be allowed to press through situations that might get an MLB starter pulled. What will get a starter pulled early is excessive pitches. If the inning’s count has crept into the mid-20s with no end in sight, a reliever will be warming in earnest. Once it surpasses 30, the pitcher (especially if younger) could be yanked before facing another batter.

In the past, Texas’s AAA pitchers tended to pitch complete innings. I used to jokingly mock opposing managers who removed pitchers mid-inning just to get their steps in. Well, the joke’s on me, because Round Rock manager Doug Davis, who took charge last year, loves the mid-inning switch. Does he ever. Davis has been around a while, so he has leave to switch pitchers and create matchups more in line with MLB usage.

Relievers

Minor league relievers tend to pitch on a schedule rather than in situational roles. Even in AAA, nominally the final training ground for the Majors, relievers usually pitch on prescribed days.  

Pitching on consecutive days, already a rarity below AAA, has become exceptionally rare even in AAA. Last year, Round Rock’s eight busiest relievers combined for only five back-to-back outings. In the past, pitching on consecutive days was a tell that a reliever might be headed for Arlington soon. Now, the relatively rigid AAA workloads and expansion of up-and-down relievers may have made that idea obsolete. AAA is still the final audition, but even with Davis in charge, relief usage operates less like the Majors than it ever has.

AAA usage has also changed much more than low-A over the past decade:

Texas AAA in 2024: 43 relievers, 3.3 per game
Texas AAA in 2012: 22 relievers, 2.4 per game

Texas Low-A in 2024: 30 relievers, 2.2 per game
Texas Low-A in 2012: 20 relievers, 2.0 per game

A good many “relievers” in low-A are tandem working multiple innings, while in AAA, relievers commonly work a single frame, so more are needed on a given night.

45 Texas minor leaguers saved a full-season game last year, led by Skylar Hales with ten. Teams don’t have set closers, or to the extent they do, they tend to place trustworthiness above ceiling. In the last 17 years, nine Texas minor league relievers have recorded 20 saves in a season. None has ever subsequently saved a Major League game. Sometimes in critical situations, managers have leeway to use relievers who’ve proven their trust more traditionally.  

Batting Orders, Position Player Starts

Batting orders aren’t necessarily optimized for run production and or aligned with the relative qualities of the prospects. Don’t worry about them.

Players tend to receive regular rest. No Marcus Semiens in the minors. 1B Arturo Disla missed an organization-low 11 games last year out of scheduled 132. Even well-regarded prospects may find themselves in a rotation, receiving a day off each week to accommodate a crowded infield or outfield. Likewise, even the least heralded will receive occasional action. I mentioned this recently in the context of Alejandro Osuna’s AA assignment. Osuna can handle AAA now, I think, and maybe he’d be there if Evan Carter hadn’t been optioned. But for now, Round Rock already has five outfielders who deserve to be in the system, and having Osuna (who deserves no more than one day off per week) up there would create too any players for too few starts.  

Errors and “Mistakes”
The number of miscues that give the opposition free runners or bases increases greatly at the lower levels.

Likewise, fielding mistakes that don’t appear in the box score increase down the ladder. For example, fielder’s choices that don’t result in outs, throws to home that miss the cutoff and allow the trail runner to advance.

Running
With MLB adopting the runner-friendly rules tested in the minors, you’ve probably got a better idea of how they affect the game. The Rangers have been especially adept at exploiting these rules. In 2021, Down East set an all-time low-A record for most successful attempts per game (2.41), and their total of 290 was only nine short of the record despite playing 20 fewer games than normal. The next year, the Woodies stole 308, setting the low-A record and falling five shy of the most by any minor league team since at least 1990.

Teams run much more often in the minors than MLB, ranging from 22% more in AAA to 75% more in the rookie ball. Across the minors in the US last year, the success rate on the bases was 78%, and rates don’t decline down the ladder despite the increased attempts.

Promotions
Promotions and demotions aren’t made in a vacuum. A promoted player is necessarily taking someone else’s spot. Should that other player also be promoted? Demoted? Moved to a different position? Released? Should the players share the position and moonlight at DH? Should the promoted guy move to a different position instead, and who would that affect? These decisions are often complicated, and a player might advance more slowly than you’d like because Texas has to sort through all these issues.
 
Age
The best prospects tend to receive aggressive assignments and are young for their levels. Down the road, they’re often omitted from my annual 40-Man / Rule 5 preview because they forced their way onto the MLB squad months earlier (Wyatt Langford, for example). If all you know about a player is his age, you actually know quite a lot. 19-year-old Sebastian Walcott will open the season in AA, as did Jurickson Profar, and Elvis Andrus before.

One shouldn’t get carried away with age, though. Of course, players drafted out of college will be older, so dismissing them for being 23 in high-A would be ridiculous. However, the older the player, the higher the expectations. (Incidentally, that a good many college players don’t handle A-level ball reinforces just how hard the pro game is.) Catchers tend to take more time, as do many pitchers.

The Rangers don’t promote as aggressively as a decade ago, and promotions feel more player-tailored and less driven by organizational culture.

Slash Stats (Average / On-Base Percentage / Slugging)
In the Majors, batting average isn’t completely useless, but it matters far less than on-base percentage and slugging. In the minors, I still like to keep an eye on it. Putting the bat on the ball with frequency and authority is what gets players noticed and moves them up the ladder.

Here’s two fictional players with 500 plate appearances. Both have a .360 OBP and .440 slugging percentage:

A)    100 hits, 10 doubles, 25 homers, 80 walks, 160 strikeouts
B)    150 hits, 33 doubles, 8 homers, 30 walks, 60 strikeouts

Same OBP, same slugging percentage, very different hitters. Ian Happ was in the vicinity of Player A last year. Player B batted .319 but doesn’t walk much or offer much more than doubles power. There aren’t many Player B type nowadays. Luis Arraez is in the ballpark.  

These stats mean the least at lower levels and gain importance as players advance. They also matter more to offense-oriented positions. Except at the extreme margin and probably not even then, a first basemen cannot compensate for weak hitting with outstanding defense. He has to hit.

Walks and Strikeouts for Hitters
The goal of a hitter is to reach base safely, so the ability to lay off iffy pitches can define a career. Walks create hitting situations with runners on base, wear down the pitcher, and mitigate inevitable slumps. Back in 2022, Aaron Zavala drew eight walks during his season-starting 0-for-16 slump, producing a .333 OBP. Would that all slumps were so productive. Zavala gave his teammates eight opportunities to hit with a runner on base, and he scored three runs in those four hitless games.

Still, walks are a means, not an end. I do worry about players who seem to rely too heavily on walks, which is easier to do at the lower levels where control is often absent. Selectivity is a great attribute. Passivity, not so much. Eventually, the hitter will rise to a level at which most pitchers not only have control but a semblance of command, and the hitter will have to adjust. Many cannot.

To some extent, we can ignore hitters’ strikeouts. What really matters is how they perform when they don’t. Not to be flip, but strikeouts for hitters don’t matter until they do. At some point, they reach a level that forces a herculean batting average on contact just to get by. An MLB hitter with league-average walk and strikeout rates need to hit about .323 on contact to post a league-average OBP of .312. A hitter who fans like Zach Gelof (34% last year) needs to hit .390 for the same OBP. (He didn’t, and his OBP was .270.)

Some hitters are exceptionally good at avoiding strikeouts, but not particularly to their benefit. Most of the time, weak contact on marginal pitches isn’t any better than a strikeout.

Usually, both walks and strikeouts increase down the organizational ladder. The combined BB/HBP rate in MLB last year was 9.5%. The minor leagues ranged from 11% to 13% in the full-season leagues and 15% at the rookie complexes. Walks exploded in low-A in 2021 and have remained elevated since.

Strikeouts have finally leveled off after years of increases, which is to say they remain historic. Not that long ago, almost any pitcher with a 25% strikeout rate was noteworthy. In 2022, all of low-A had a 25.5% K rate, and last year dipped to 24.8%. No league at any level averaged fewer than 8.9 strikeouts per nine innings. A pitcher with one strikeout per inning is at best average, usually below.

ERA
I do list ERA when recapping pitchers. Much of the time, it’s a handy stat, but it’s not the end-all and sometimes is lying to you. Let’s take two pitchers from the lower levels in 2024:

Player A: 3.34 ERA, 1 HR per 64 batters, 13% BB/HBP rate, 19% SO rate
Player B: 4.39 ERA, no HR allowed, 8% BB/HBP rate, 32% SO rate

Player A had the better ERA, but I’d pick Player B in a critical situation.

You’ll occasionally read something from me like “he’s pitched better [or worse] than his ERA would suggest.” If Players A and B continue to pitch as they have, Player B is far more likely to have the lower ERA eventually.

Homers, Walks and Strikeouts for Pitchers
These are better indicators than ERA, which is often tied to luck on balls in play and (for starters) how well relievers strand runners left behind. That ties to the Players A and B example above.

Homers are trickier to analyze. More fly balls equal more homers, of course, but HR rates can bounce around crazily from year to year for no other reason than variance. Walk and strikeout rates tend to stabilize more quickly.

A combined BB/HBP of 10%, slightly problematic a dozen years ago, is now well below average in most leagues. My old rule of thumb was that a BB/HBP rate of 15% was untenable for a would-be starting pitcher, because he’d run into trouble too often and force too many bullpen innings. In 2023, more low-A Carolina League starts had a BB/HBP rate above 15% than below 10%, although that was not the case last year. In any case, more pitchers seem to be able to abide the higher walk rate because they’re darn near unhittable otherwise, and they aren’t being asked to face as many batters. Even so, as they climb the ladder, those walks are more likely to cause trouble.

Strikeouts have risen so much that I still have to remind myself what constitutes an acceptable rate. In 2007, my first year on the job, the best team in the low-A Midwest League (which contained Texas-affiliated Clinton) had a strikeout rate of 21.3%. Last year, the worst team in the low-A Carolina League (including Down East) had a rate of 23%.

The gap between starters and relievers has disappeared. Again comparing Texas’s low-A leagues from past to present, the 50 busiest starters had a strikeout rate of 19% in 2007 and 25% in 2024. The corresponding figures for the 50 relievers finishing the most games were 25% and 24%. Yes, starters actually struck out batters at a higher rate than relievers last year.

HBPs are kind of an afterthought in typical stat-watching, but they’ve risen greatly in recent years, and some pitchers are plunk-prone enough to seriously degrade their performance. Last year, low-A Carolina hit 122 batters in 129 games.

Fielding

Fielding is trickiest to evaluate from an outsider’s perspective. Fielding percentage rarely tells the whole story.

For example, over the course of a season, let’s pretend two infielders share shortstop duties equally. On their first 400 grounders, they’re identical statistically. But then on their next 20 grounders apiece, Shortstop 1 fails to reach any, but Shortstop 2 reaches all of them and turns 15 into outs and throws 5 into the stands, allowing those hitters to reach second. Shortstop 2 will have a worse fielding percentage, but he also turned 15 more balls into outs. Would you rather an opposing batter reach first safely 20 times, or reach second 5 times but get put out the other 15 times? Shortstop 2 is far more effective despite making more errors.

Even with no stats, you can learn plenty simply from where someone plays. Since-traded Echedry Vargas made 85 low-A starts at shortstop last season. He was sometimes sloppy, and it’s an open question as to whether he’ll stick (unlikely), but he was the best infield prospect on the squad, so shortstop was his spot.

If a particular player has a monopoly on SS or CF, you’ve got three potential scenarios: 1) Irrespective of prospect status, he’s the best at the position; 2) He might not be the best fielder, but he’s a better prospect and expected to continue there at a higher level; 3)  He isn’t the best fielder and probably will move in the long run, but he’s the best prospect, and there’s no harm in seeing if he can grow into the position.

Field and League Context

Here’s the park-adjusted league averages for Texas’s full-season affiliates in 2024:

Round Rock: 5.6 runs per game, .262/.352/.429 slash line, 0.98 park factor
Frisco: 4.7 runs, .242/.328/.481, 1.04 park factor
Hickory: 4.6 runs, .231/.319/.372, 1.02 park factor
Down East: 4.3 runs, .224/.318/.326, 0.96 park factor

Round Rock suppresses offense relative to most of its peers, but the Pacific Coast League is so hitter-oriented as a whole that even Express hitters’ stats have to be viewed with a little cynicism. Down East was a pitcher-friendly park in a pitcher-friendly league. This year, Hickory’s friendlier park shifts to low-A, and we’ll await feedback on the new high-A park in Spartanburg.   

The homer rate in low-A is about 48% lower than MLB. A good many players haven’t reached full physical maturity.

Statcast
Statcast data became available for Texas’s AAA league in 2022, and this spring, it became much more widely available in Spring Training games. Jack Leiter introducing a sinker and adjusted changeup to his repertoire? Marc Church mixing in some changes? Alejandro Osuna showing MLB-quality pop? All information now publicly available for anyone to analyze should they desire. (I desire.)

I do my own analysis of every tracked pitch so I can ascertain who’s missing bats and with what, who’s swinging at the most out-of-zone pitches,, who has a high average but might not be hitting with MLB-caliber force, and so on. I categorize every ball in play based on what it typically produced in the Majors, not in AAA. Plenty of balls that become extra-base hits in the hitter-friendly Pacific Coast League may just be long outs in a typical MLB park. It’s not a perfect system but for example, it gives me an idea of what percentage of a hitters’ homers were sure things versus more likely outs or doubles under typical MLB conditions.  

Luck
The likelihood of a .250 batter going hitless in 16 consecutive at-bats is small: almost exactly one in 100. Spread that to 36 hitters (nine per Texas’s four full-season teams) and the likelihood that someone starts the season 0-for-16 jumps to nearly one in three, still uncommon but not rare. Aaron Zavala began 2022 0-for-16 (with eight walks). In 2023, Justin Foscue didn’t collect a hit until his 18th at-bat. Nobody reached that mark last year, but more than one came close.

Over the course of an entire season, the likelihood of someone having an even longer hitless stretch is virtually assured. Statistical variance in baseball is much higher than most people think. Don’t place too much emphasis on the short run, whether good or bad. (On the other hand, Sebastian Walcott’s 1-for-21 start in 2024 wasn’t unlucky. He really was that bad! He got better.)

Runs Scored, RBI, Pitcher Wins/Losses
Ignored except as occasional anecdotes.

Report Tone
Most of Texas’s minor leaguers aren’t going to reach MLB or make much impact if they do. Texas has 26 Major Leaguers and well over 200 minor leaguers. The cold math turns most of them into “failures.”

They are not failures. They’re exceptional athletes in an industry with a very limited number of jobs. If you’re the 2,000th best accountant in the country, you’re doing great, plus you can start your own business if you want. The 2,000th professional baseball player is in Double A, and he can’t start his own league to compete against MLB.

Also, the players themselves have never been better. There are pitchers stuck in AAA with repertoires that I guarantee would have made them passable MLB relievers a dozen years ago. There are hitters who would at least be injury fill-ins. The population of the United States has increased 25% in the last 26 years. The number of Major League organizations has increased by 0%.

Ultimately, I want to be honest about a player’s likelihood of reaching the Majors and of success at that level, and I focus on the prospects most likely to help Texas in the future, but I’ll cover anyone having a great day.